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Introduction
International investment, and cooperation to facilitate it, can be critical in the fight against
inequality and poverty. Cross-border investment activities by MNEs could establish operations
and channel capital and technology to areas where it is badly needed, spurring economic growth,
job creation, and higher wages. To the extent that IIAs catalyze cross-border investment activity,
increasing the pay of low income workers, or increasing the tax revenue that can be used to
redistribute wealth, they could help combat intra-national inequality.
However, the more than 3,000 international investment agreements (IIAs) that govern foreign
investment, and the investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) mechanism they contain instead
entrench and exacerbate intra-national inequality. They do so in at least two ways. First, they
provide covered multinational enterprises (MNEs) greater procedural power than other private
individuals and entities under international and domestic law, both with respect to relations with
the host state government, and in connection with disputes with other private parties. Second,
compounding these privileged procedural rights, IIAs also provide those MNEs enhanced
substantive standards of protection that strengthen the legal force of their economic rights and
“expectations,” with potentially negative impacts on competing rights and interests held by others.
IIAs and Unequal Procedural Rights for MNEs
Designed to increase investment flows by protecting foreign investors from political risk, IIAs
typically: (1) prohibit host states from discriminating against MNEs; (2) require host states to
provide MNEs “fair and equitable” treatment; (3) require governments to pay prompt, adequate
and effective compensation for MNEs or MNEs’ assets that they expropriate; and, (4) prevent host
states from restricting MNEs’ abilities to transfer capital in and out of the country.
Most IIAs give MNEs the extraordinary power to bring ISDS claims against host states to
challenge, and seek monetary and other awards for, government conduct that breaches the IIAs’
provisions. This ability to bypass domestic courts and to sue governments directly through
supranational systems is exceptional. For one, it represents a fundamental departure from
traditional practice under international law. Under most international treaties, only states have had
the power to enforce other states’ international law obligations.3 The international human rights
legal framework notably departs from this trend. It allows non-state actors to challenge state
conduct, but also requires those seeking to challenge government conduct to first exhaustively seek
relief through domestic legal systems before bringing claims through international bodies.
The ability of MNEs to initiate ISDS proceedings is similarly exceptional as compared to the
ability of private individuals and entities to challenge government conduct under many domestic
legal systems. Domestic jurisdictions typically employ various doctrines that both permit and
restrict government exposure to litigation and liability for different types of conduct. They balance
myriad policy considerations relating to diverse objectives (e.g., compensating victims, deterring
future wrongful conduct, penalizing wrongdoers, and appropriately safeguarding government
3
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power and resources), reflected in rules and doctrines about who can bring claims, for what kind
of harms, with what impact on third parties or future government conduct, what available remedies,
etc… IIAs, however, allow MNEs to bypass such domestic legal restrictions by bringing their
claims through the ISDS system, in which such domestic procedural rules do not apply. Giving
MNEs access to ISDS and the ability to sidestep domestic rules when those rules are adverse to
them, and avoid restraints on litigation otherwise applicable to all, gives MNEs greater power than
non-MNEs to challenge government action and inaction. Even before an ISDS claim is filed or
ISDS decision reached, the mere fact that only MNEs can sue through ISDS can potentially cause
the government to devote greater attention and accord greater deference to the preferences and
interests of MNEs than the government otherwise would; in some cases, this heightened attention
might be to the detriment of competing preferences and interests.4
Take, for example, a situation in which the interests of stakeholder groups diverge. If, for instance,
a government decision to issue a permit would be opposed by environmentalists, and a decision to
deny the permit would be opposed by an MNE, the agency responsible for deciding which option
to pursue may be influenced by knowledge that the environmentalists could not mount a lawsuit
challenging the government’s decision but that the MNE could sue the government for vast sums
through ISDS. This additional relief mechanism would likely influence the resulting persuasive
power of the competing groups.
In addition to giving MNEs greater power than non-MNEs vis-à-vis the government, ISDS also
gives MNEs greater power than non-MNEs in legal disputes directly between those two groups.
Assume, for example, that a domestic citizen successfully sues an MNE in host country courts for
harms caused by the MNE, and is awarded monetary compensation for injuries suffered. The MNE
may then be able to turn to ISDS to seek to undo or otherwise eliminate the effects of its court loss.
In contrast, if the MNE were to have prevailed in the domestic court proceedings, the domestic
citizen would have no similar power to seek a different outcome through ISDS. With access to
ISDS, MNEs thus have greater opportunities to get their desired results than their non-MNE
opponents do.
Investors’ use of that procedural mechanism to get one more “bite at the apple” may create or
exacerbate inequalities between, on the one hand, MNEs and their shareholders and, on the other
hand, all other stakeholders without access to ISDS. Investors have used ISDS to contest decisions
regarding damages for environmental harm, 5 the relative rights of creditors and debtors in
bankruptcy proceedings, 6 contests over land ownership, 7 citizen suits challenging permitting
decisions for extractive industry operations,8 the legitimacy of intellectual property protections in
the manufacture of generic pharmaceuticals,9 and other unfavorable litigation proceedings and
4
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outcomes between the MNEs and other private individuals and entities before domestic courts.
This disparity in legal power between MNEs with access to supranational ISDS mechanisms to
advance their economic rights and interests and other stakeholders without such access can shift
the outcomes in discrete cases, and may even shift broader contours of the law in favor of MNEs
and away from other stakeholders, diffuse public interests and non-economic interests.
IIAs and Unequal Substantive Rights for MNEs
Beyond the privileged procedural rights that IIAs give to MNEs, enhanced substantive protections
included in IIAs further empower MNEs and limit the ability of governments to act in the interests
of other stakeholders. Particularly because property rights are a zero-sum game, in which
“protecting the resource claims of some parties requires preventing others from using those same
resources,”10 decisions on their definition and scope are a product of a rich history and ongoing
contestation.11 Distributions of economic, social, and political power shape property rights; and,
in turn, property rights can shape those distributions of power.12
Traditionally, international law has left domestic jurisdictions—and the social forces, political
processes, and legal institutions within them—significant latitude to define the scope of property
rights and to allocate them among members of society.13 IIAs, however, have changed that. For
instance, rather than merely protecting property rights as defined and redefined through domestic
processes, IIAs—and, in particular, their “fair and equitable treatment” (FET) obligations as
interpreted and enforced by ISDS14—have effectively become tools for creating new property
rights to be enjoyed by MNEs. Specifically, arbitral tribunals interpreting and applying IIAs have
created a legal doctrine through which they protect certain expectations held by foreign investors
regarding future government treatment, and order host states to pay compensation if government
conduct deviates from those expectations. Arbitral tribunals thereby effectively convert mere
expectations regarding treatment of foreign-owned firms into legally recognized rights enforceable
against the state.
Additionally, ISDS decisions are determining the line between permissible laws, regulations and
judicial decisions, and arbitrary, disproportionate or other interferences with economic interests
that require compensation for lost future profits or other economic “harms”; 15 in many cases,
tribunals are drawing those lines differently than domestic legal systems have – even those with
strong systems of property rights protections.16
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Compounding these issues, IIAs expressly only seek to protect the rights and interests of MNEs
and their owners, with no meaningful opportunity for those who may be adversely impacted by
MNEs’ claims to protect themselves. IIA provisions, as interpreted and applied in ISDS, limit the
ability of governments to legislate, regulate, or adjudicate in ways that frustrate MNEs’ economic
rights and interests; consequently, IIAs and ISDS diminish the competing rights and claims of
other stakeholders, undermining efforts to reduce inequality.
These protections can also worsen inequality by entrenching the status quo in the face of reforms
to promote greater equity. For instance, the general rule adopted by tribunals is that the doctrine
of “legitimate expectations,” interpreted as being part of the FET obligation, protects expectations
held at the time the investment is made, including that the legal framework governing or affecting
an MNE will not change over time (or will not change much) 17 through court decisions,
administrative actions, shifts in policies or practices, changes in legislation or other means of legal
evolution.
If subsequent government conduct exceeds the MNE’s “legitimate expectations,” granting more
favorable treatment than the MNE had anticipated at the time of the investment, then the MNE
keeps those gains; but if the government frustrates the investor’s expectations, the government
may be ordered to compensate them for any difference between their hoped-for and actual
economic position.
One likely effect will be that, over time, the legal and policy framework will become increasingly
favorable to MNEs. Because IIAs typically only permit investors to initiate claims against states
(neither states nor other individuals or entities may initiate IIA claims against MNEs), the
outcomes of ISDS decisions will generally only be to (1) uphold the property rights of MNEs as
they existed under the host state’s domestic law, or (2) expand the property rights protections
enjoyed by MNEs under that law. ISDS proceedings will never narrow the property rights enjoyed
by covered MNEs under host state law. Thus, beyond the specific effects that protection of
investors’ rights and expectations has in a particular case, the structure of the ISDS system is such
that, over time, it will lead to a general expansion of the legal protections for MNEs’ economic
interests, and corresponding expansion of state (taxpayer) liability for conduct interfering with
those interests.
This effect of protecting the status quo against change that negatively impacts MNEs can also
entrench or increase inequality among firms by safeguarding the power of market incumbents as
compared to new players. If, for example, a government decides to remove or decrease subsidies
given to existing businesses (e.g., coal-fired power plants), and/or increase subsidies given to
potential new competitors (e.g., generators of renewable energy), that may trigger an ISDS claim
by the incumbents. Similarly, if the government passes new environmental or other obligations
that would impose new costs on firms, it may proactively exempt incumbents from having to
comply so as not to trigger a dispute, thereby favoring incumbents relative to newcomers.
In addition to disadvantaging those competitors without access to ISDS, the ability of MNEs to
entrench favorable aspects of the status quo harms other interests that would benefit from
17
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adjustments to law and policy. Notably, MNEs have used ISDS to challenge government efforts
to combat three of the most inequality-inducing effects that can arise from property rights
systems—negative externalities, abusive practices of monopoly rights holders, and undue
appropriation of gains. Investors have used ISDS to, for example, secure compensation for
environmental laws and decisions that seek to minimize or avoid environmental externalities;18
regulate tariffs or tackle anti-competitive pricing in provision of public services; 19 or limit
intellectual property rights, and assess “windfall profits taxes” seeking to capture a greater share
of gains derived from the rising price of natural resources (i.e., gains not derived from the
investor’s increased efficiency or skill).20 These types of decisions, which are based on a relatively
singular focus on MNEs’ economic rights and expectations, do not take into account the broader
implications that such protections have for inequality.
Conclusion
As described above, IIAs provide MNEs privileged access to procedural remedies and strong
substantive protections that favor MNEs’ property rights and expectations, creating and
exacerbating inequality among a diverse group of other stakeholders. Furthermore, they allow
MNEs to entrench the status quo, favoring incumbents and MNEs’ interests more generally. A
number of known ISDS cases illustrates each of these practices and effects, but the extent of the
trends has not been well-researched, in part because of the confidentiality of MNE-government
interactions and in part of because of the challenge of isolating government motivations.
While further research could dig deeper on the effects of existing international investment
governance on inequality, scholars should also explore whether and how IIAs could be enlisted as
a tool to combat intra-national inequality. As the system of international economic governance
expands, and as intra-national inequality increases, it is crucial to understand the links between the
two phenomena and how law can be used to advance, and not undermine, equality.
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